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In the case of Kitzmiller et al. v. Dover Area School District, et al., Judge Jones 
ruled that a pro-intelligent design disclaimer cannot be read to public school 
students. In his decision, he gave demarcation criteria for what counts as science, 
ruling that intelligent design fails these criteria. I argue that these criteria are 
flawed, with most of my focus on the criterion of methodological naturalism. The 
way to refute intelligent design is not by declaring it unscientific, but by showing 
that the empirical evidence for design is not there.  
 
 
1. Introduction.  In December 2005, U.S. federal judge John E. Jones III handed 
down his decision in the much-publicized case of Kitzmiller et al. v. Dover Area 
School District, et al. The ruling holds that it is unconstitutional for the Dover 
Area School District to require that a pro-intelligent design disclaimer be read to 
public school students during the course of teaching them evolutionary theory. 
Intelligent design isn’t really explained in the disclaimer: all it says is that 
“Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs from 
Darwin’s view” (Jones 2005, 2). For a more careful definition, consider this 
statement from the Discovery Institute: 
The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the universe 
and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an 
undirected process such as natural selection. (Discovery Institute, 2006) 
(I will have more to say about the exact content of the theory of intelligent design 
below.) 
Jones’s ruling holds that that intelligent design (ID) counts as religion, not 
science, and hence the teaching of ID in public school is unconstitutional. In 
Jones’s 139 page decision, he gives an answer to the contentious demarcation 
question – what criteria can we use to demarcate science from non-science? I will 
argue that Jones’s proposed demarcation criteria are fundamentally flawed. Most 
of my discussion will focus on the issue of methodological naturalism – I will 
argue that rejection of the supernatural should not be a part of scientific 
methodology.  
 The reason this matters is that it’s a dangerous practice to try to impose 
rigid boundaries on what counts as science. For example, as I will show, a 
consequence of Jones’s criteria is that the aim of science is not truth. While this 
may be the case, one would expect this to be established by philosophical 
argumentation about the aim of science (along the lines of e.g. van Fraassen 
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1980), not by a specification of demarcation criteria to distinguish science from 
pseudoscience. My position is that scientists should be free to pursue hypotheses 
as they see fit, without being constrained by a particular philosophical account of 
what science is. 
 For the purposes of this essay, I’m not really interested in whether it’s 
constitutionally permissible for the Dover Area School District to read the 
disclaimer to their students. My personal opinion is that it shouldn’t be done – not 
because it’s constitutionally impermissible, not because intelligent design isn’t 
science, but simply because reading such a disclaimer is bad pedagogy. But I am 
trained as a philosopher; I have no special insight as to whether ID should be 
taught in science class. More precisely, I have no specialized training which 
would help me to answer the following two questions: supposing ID counts as 
science, should it be taught in science class? Supposing ID does not count as 
science, should it be taught in science class? I do, however, have specialized 
training which will help me to answer the question of whether ID counts as 
science.  
 So does ID count as science? I maintain that it is a mistake to put too 
much weight on that question. Larry Laudan got the answer right: 
If we would stand up and be counted on the side of reason, we ought to 
drop terms like “pseudo-science” and “unscientific” from our vocabulary; 
they are just hollow phrases which do only emotive work for us. (Laudan 
1983, 349) 
If our goal is to believe truth and avoid falsehood, and if we are rational people 
who take into account evidence in deciding what to believe, then we need to focus 
on the question of what evidence there is for and against ID. The issue of whether 
ID counts as “science” according to some contentious answer to the demarcation 
question is unimportant. Of course, on this approach it would be much harder to 
get a federal judge to rule that ID can’t be taught in public school. But sometimes 
it is more important to be intellectually honest than to do what it takes to stop 
people from doing something you don’t like.  
  
2. Jones’s Demarcation Criteria.  In Jones’s decision, he implicitly gives three 
necessary criteria for something to count as science. He maintains that ID fails all 
three: 
We find that ID fails on three different levels, any one of which is 
sufficient to preclude a determination that ID is science. They are: (1) ID 
violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by invoking and 
permitting supernatural causation; (2) the argument of irreducible 
complexity, central to ID, employs the same flawed and illogical contrived 
dualism that doomed creation science in the 1980’s; and (3) ID’s negative 
attacks on evolution have been refuted by the scientific community.  
(Jones 2005, 64) 
I find all three criteria unconvincing. The first criterion is the most promising one, 
so I’ll have most to say about it. But I will start by taking issue with the third and 
second criteria.  
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2.1. The Scientific Community.  Let’s start with the third criterion, that ID’s 
negative attacks on evolution have been refuted by the scientific community. 
There are two problems with this criterion.   
Even if it is true that ID’s negative attacks are wrong, that doesn’t 
necessarily impugn ID’s positive doctrines. Suppose that Theory A is in 
competition with Theory B, and suppose that the proponents of Theory A have 
given bad arguments against Theory B, arguments which have been refuted by the 
scientific community. This is compatible with Theory A being true, and 
moreover, this is compatible with there being good scientific evidence for Theory 
A. This is also compatible with there being good scientific evidence against 
Theory B – it could simply be that the proponents of Theory A picked the wrong 
arguments to give against Theory B.  
Now, suppose that it’s not only the case that ID’s negative attacks have 
been refuted, but also that ID itself has been refuted. Even so, this doesn’t make 
ID unscientific. Consider Newtonian physics – this is uncontroversially a 
scientific theory. Note that it counts as a scientific theory even though it has been 
refuted. (For example, Newtonian physics predicts that clocks in differing 
gravitational fields will run at the same rate, while it has been empirically shown 
that clocks in stronger gravitational fields run slower.)  
 One might be tempted to say that under the supposition that ID is false, we 
can at least conclude that it shouldn’t be taught in public school. But even that 
doesn’t follow: Newtonian physics is false, and yet that is the theory that 
everyone is taught in high school physics classes. (For more on this point, see 
Fitelson 2006.) I conclude that even if ID’s negative attacks on evolution have 
been refuted by the scientific community, it doesn’t follow that ID is not science.  
 
2.2. Irreducible Complexity.  Jones’s second criterion is that the argument of 
irreducible complexity is flawed. Here Jones has in mind the arguments given by 
Michael Behe (1996). Behe argues that some biochemical systems are irreducibly 
complex: they have multiple parts, and they need all their parts to do anything. 
Behe claims that we wouldn’t expect such systems to arise via evolutionary 
means, since random chance would have to bring all the parts together at once for 
the system to be functional; the existence of the system can’t be accounted for via 
a step-wise evolutionary process. 
This demarcation criterion is no good, and one way we can see that is by 
going back to the second point made just above. Just because an argument is 
flawed, it doesn’t follow that the argument is unscientific. Scientists sometimes 
give flawed arguments, but they are still doing science when they do so.  
This demarcation criterion is mistaken in other ways too. ID consists of 
more than Behe’s argument from irreducible complexity. For example, there are 
physics-based arguments for ID, such as the fine-tuning argument, which have 
nothing to do with irreducible complexity. (According to the fine-tuning 
argument, some of the values of the fundamental constants in physics are fine-
tuned for life, in the sense that if the values were slightly different life couldn’t 
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exist. This arguably provides evidence for the existence of God. For more on this 
argument, see for example Monton 2006.)  In addition to physics-based 
arguments for ID, there are also biology-based arguments for ID that have nothing 
to do with irreducible complexity. For example, one popular pro-ID argument is 
to claim that the origin of life from non-life is so improbable, it would take a 
miracle for it to occur. (See for example Strobel 2004, 37-42.) 
 
2.3. Methodological Naturalism.  We come now to the most promising of Jones’s 
three criteria, the criterion of methodological naturalism. In this section I will 
grant that ID does postulate supernatural causation, and I will argue that that is 
compatible with it being scientific. In the next section I will ague that in fact ID is 
not inherently supernatural, and hence ID can count as science even if the 
restriction to naturalism is part of the scientific methodology. 
 I will now argue that it is counterproductive to restrict scientific activity in 
such a way that hypotheses that invoke the supernatural are ruled out. 
Specifically, I will argue that it is possible to get scientific evidence for the 
existence of God. The scenario I am about to describe is implausible, but there is 
nothing logically inconsistent about it. The point of the scenario is that in the 
described situation, it would be reasonable for scientists to postulate and test the 
hypothesis that there is supernatural causation occurring. (I am not the first to 
present this sort of scenario; for a related scenario, see Dembski 1992.) 
Imagine that some astronomers discover a pulsar that is pulsing out Morse 
code. The message says that it’s from God, and that God is causing the pulsar to 
pulse in this unusual way. The astronomers are initially skeptical, but they find 
that when they formulate questions in their head, the questions are correctly 
answered by the message. The astronomers bring in other people to examine this, 
and the questions are consistently answered. The message goes on to suggest 
certain experiments that scientists should perform in particle accelerators – the 
message says that if the experiments are set up in a specified precise way, then 
God will cause a miracle to occur. The experiments are done, and the resulting 
cloud chamber tracks spell out Biblical verses. Then the message explains to the 
scientists how to form a proper quantum theory of gravity… 
I could go on, but you get the picture. The evidence doesn’t prove that 
God exists – maybe some advanced alien civilization is playing a trick on us; 
maybe the scientists are undergoing some sort of mass hallucination; maybe all 
this is happening due to some incredibly improbable quantum fluctuation. But the 
evidence does provide some support for the hypothesis that God exists. It would 
be silly for the scientists to refuse to countenance the hypothesis that God exists, 
due to some commitment to methodological naturalism. Of course, it is important 
to consider the naturalistic hypotheses, but one has to consider the theistic 
hypothesis as well.  
Note that the theistic hypothesis here is testable. For example, when the 
message tells the scientists that they will get a miraculous result from certain 
experimental setups, the scientists are testing the hypothesis the pulsar message is 
from God. If the experiments had not resulted in any unusual data, this would 
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provide disconfirming evidence for the hypothesis that the message is from God. 
Hence, the fact that the experiments do result in unusual data provides some 
confirming evidence for the hypothesis that the message is from God. (The 
probability shift in favor of the hypothesis that the message is from God may be 
small, but the point is just that the unusual data does count as confirming 
evidence.)  
The fact that the theistic hypothesis here is testable shows that some of the 
expert testimony that Jones relied on in formulating his decision is flawed. 
Specifically, philosopher of science Robert Pennock claims, in his expert report, 
that “Supernaturalism is not allowed” in science, “because it is not testable” 
(Pennock 2005a, 11). I have given a counterexample to that line of reasoning, by 
presenting a situation where a supernatural hypothesis is testable.   
Jones, in support of his demarcation criterion of methodological 
naturalism, cites the definition of science from the prestigious National Academy 
of Sciences: 
Science is a particular way of knowing about the world. In science, 
explanations are restricted to those that can be inferred from the 
confirmable data – the results obtained through observations and 
experiments that can be substantiated by other scientists. Anything that 
can be observed or measured is amenable to scientific investigation. 
Explanations that cannot be based upon empirical evidence are not part of 
science. (in Jones 2005, 66) 
Just after this quote, Jones says that “This rigorous attachment to ‘natural’ 
explanations is an essential attribute to science by definition and by convention.” 
But in fact the NAS definition never makes reference to “natural” explanations – 
there is no restriction to naturalism at all in their definition. In my hypothetical 
scenario described above, the supernatural explanation is based on empirical 
evidence, evidence that is obtained through observations and experiments that can 
be substantiated by other scientists. It follows that, on the NAS definition of 
science, supernatural explanations are in principle allowed, and hence it is 
illegitimate for Jones to appeal to their definition to support his demarcation 
criterion of methodological naturalism. 
 I don’t know how Jones would respond to my argument against 
methodological naturalism based on the pulsar example, but I do have evidence 
for how Pennock (also a supporter of methodological naturalism) would respond. 
At the end of Pennock’s expert report, he writes: “if someone were to find a way 
to empirically confirm the existence of an immaterial designer or any other 
supernatural being, science should change its methodology” (Pennock 2005a, 29). 
Pennock might then say that my pulsar example is one where the existence of a 
supernatural being has been empirically confirmed, and that in that situation 
science should change its methodology. 
There is a problem with this idea that science should change its 
methodology in light of empirical confirmation of the existence of a supernatural 
being. How does this empirical confirmation take place, if not scientifically? By 
Pennock’s lights, there must be some other epistemic practice that one can engage 
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in where one can get empirical evidence for some proposition. What epistemic 
practice is this, and why doesn’t it count as science? Pennock doesn’t say. Also, 
note that the scientific status of that epistemic practice will presumably shift: at a 
time before one gets the empirical evidence that a supernatural being exists, the 
epistemic practice is unscientific, but after one gets that empirical evidence, the 
methodology of science changes in such a way that the epistemic practice 
(presumably) counts as scientific.  
 By Pennock’s lights, it is possible for ID to count as science. All the ID 
proponents need to do is to provide enough evidence to confirm that there is a 
supernatural being – then scientific methodology will no longer include 
methodological naturalism. Thus, given that scientific methodology can change in 
light of new evidence, the debate over whether ID counts as science hinges on the 
debate over whether there is empirical evidence that confirms the existence of a 
supernatural being. I am happy with this result, because this latter debate is the 
one that is interesting and important. We shouldn’t get caught up debating 
whether ID counts as science; the focus should be on the empirical arguments for 
and against ID.  
 To sum up, I reject Pennock’s claim that science should change its 
methodology if the existence of a supernatural being is empirically confirmed – 
but even if Pennock’s claim is correct, it is possible that ID can still count as 
science. Now, I will turn to the final issue of this section, the issue of whether 
there is a consensus in the scientific and philosophical communities that 
methodological naturalism is a constraint of science. Jones’s judgment reads as if 
there is a consensus, while I maintain that there is not. I can understand why Jones 
would think that there is a consensus, since expert witnesses for the plaintiffs 
testified that there is, and the defense didn’t do an adequate job refuting that. 
 First, I will examine whether there is a scientific consensus in favor of 
methodological naturalism. The most straightforward approach here would be to 
do an opinion poll of scientists, but (as far as I can tell) no one has done that. 
Pennock (2005a, 11; 2005b, 28-9) argues that there is such a scientific consensus 
by citing a literature search – nowhere in the contemporary scientific literature 
could he find scientists appealing to the supernatural. After he describes this 
literature search during his direct examination, this exchange follows: 
 Q: So methodological naturalism is basic to the nature of science today?  
 A: As I said, I could not find an exception to that.  
 Q: And the rule is well accepted in the scientific community? 
 A: That’s right.  (Pennock 2005b, 29) 
There is a problem with the line of reasoning that goes from the results of the 
literature search to a conclusion about accepted scientific methodology. Just 
because there are no appeals to the supernatural in current scientific literature, it 
in no way follows that such appeals are excluded on methodological grounds. 
Consider the following parallel situation: a literature search will show that there is 
no postulation of the existence of an elementary particle with mass 1.73615 times 
that of the electron. But it in no way follows that the postulation of such a particle 
is excluded on methodological grounds. The reason that such a postulation 
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doesn’t appear in a literature search is that there’s no evidence for such a particle. 
I maintain that one can find no postulation of the supernatural for the same 
reason.  
 Since I don’t have the resources to do an opinion poll, I will simply cite 
some counterexamples to the proposition that all scientists endorse 
methodological naturalism. Of course, scientists who are proponents of ID, like 
biochemist Michael Behe, reject methodological naturalism, but even some 
scientists who are opponents of ID reject it as well. For example, physicist Mark 
Perakh, in his anti-ID book Unintelligent Design, writes: 
a definition of science should not put any limits on legitimate subjects for 
the scientific exploration of the world. Indeed, although science has so far 
had no need to attribute any observed phenomena to a supernatural cause, 
and in doing so has achieved staggering successes, there still remain 
unanswered many fundamental questions about nature. … Until such 
answers are found, nothing should be prohibited as a legitimate subject of 
science, and excluding the supernatural out of hand serves no useful 
purpose.  (Perakh 2004, 358) 
I conclude that it is not evident that there is a consensus by scientists in favor of 
methodological naturalism.  
 Now, I will turn to the issue of whether there is a consensus by 
philosophers of science that methodological naturalism is a constraint of science. 
During Pennock’s cross-examination, he was asked the following question: 
Q: Dr. Pennock, isn’t it true that there’s not agreement among 
philosophers of science concerning the validity of methodological 
naturalism?  
Pennock implies that only philosophers of science who are sympathetic to ID 
reject methodological naturalism: 
A: The term methodological naturalism is fairly straightforward in the 
literature. There have been criticisms of it from people like Del Ratzsch 
from discussions specifically of this debate. So there’s some who have 
taken up a sympathetic position to the intelligent design folks and tried to 
argue that we could dispense with this. (Pennock 2005b, 84) 
Larry Laudan (1983) is a good counterexample to this: he is not sympathetic to 
ID, yet he rejects methodological naturalism as a demarcation criterion for 
science. (This follows from the sentence from Laudan’s paper I quoted in Section 
1, as well as from the rest of Laudan’s paper.) Later in cross-examination, the 
defense asks Pennock about Laudan. After Pennock says that he is familiar with 
Laudan, he is asked: 
Q: And Larry Laudan said he believes that creationism is science, it’s just 
bad science, correct?  
Pennock’s response to this question takes up three pages of the trial transcript. In 
my opinion, Pennock misleadingly implies that Laudan would endorse 
methodological naturalism. Pennock says that if creationism is understood as a 
naturalistic hypothesis (focusing on its naturalistic implications about the age of 
the Earth, for example), then it is bad science, but if it is understood 
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supernaturalistically, then it is not science at all. Pennock doesn’t explicitly 
attribute this view to Laudan, but someone who hadn’t read Laudan would 
probably come away thinking that this is Laudan’s view. For example, Pennock 
says: 
If you seriously take the supernatural possibility, then you can’t 
disconfirm it. So that’s the sense in which it’s important to say under the 
assumption of methodological naturalism, we have disconfirmed it, it’s 
bad science, that’s what Laudan is talking about, but if you were to take 
seriously the non-natural part, that’s to say rejecting scientific method, 
then it’s just not science… (Pennock 2005b, 104-5) 
Now, what the defense should have done here is pushed Pennock to clarify, to 
make clear to Jones that Laudan does not endorse methodological naturalism. But 
in fact the defense responds to Pennock’s three-page answer with the following: 
Thank you, Your Honor. I have no further questions.  (Pennock 2005b, 
105)  
The defense dropped the ball: it would be reasonable for Jones to conclude on the 
basis of this cross-examination that (except for a few supporters of ID) 
philosophers of science agree that that methodological naturalism is a constraint 
of science. 
Of course, Laudan is not the only philosopher of science who rejects 
methodological naturalism. I’ll cite just one more example, that of anti-ID 
philosopher Niall Shanks. Shanks says that he endorses methodological 
naturalism, but he gives a nonstandard account of methodological naturalism, an 
account proponents of ID would be pretty happy with: 
The methodological naturalist will not simply rule hypotheses about 
supernatural causes out of court … But the methodological naturalist will 
insist on examining the evidence presented to support the existence of 
supernatural causes carefully …. methodological naturalists do not rule 
out the supernatural absolutely. They have critical minds, not closed 
minds.  (Shanks 2004, 141-2) 
I conclude that it’s not the case that there’s a clear consensus in favor of 
methodological naturalism (when understood to rule out appeals to the 
supernatural) in the scientific or philosophical communities.  
 
3. ID is Not Inherently Theistic.  Let’s suppose that the above arguments are 
incorrect, and that in fact methodological naturalism is a demarcation criterion for 
science. I will now argue that this does not entail that ID is unscientific, since ID 
is not inherently supernatural. 
 It is true that most – perhaps all – proponents of ID are theists, and it’s 
true that they sometimes say things that imply that ID has supernatural 
consequences. For example, Jones, in his decision (2005, 67), quotes defense 
witness Steve Fuller, who referred in his expert report to “ID’s rejection of 
naturalism and commitment to supernaturalism”. Pennock (2005a, 25) emphasizes 
in his expert report that “ID is inherently theistic”, and the bulk of Barbara 
Forrest’s lengthy expert report is devoted to arguing that “Anti-naturalism is an 
 9
integral part of ID” (Forrest 2005, 1). Jones agrees with these assessments, and 
that it why he maintains that ID fails the methodological naturalism demarcation 
criterion. 
 “ID” means different things to different people, and while some view it as 
essentially committed to supernaturalism, others do not. What this really boils 
down to is a terminological issue. In the official formulations of ID that 
proponents give nowadays, they are careful to avoid any commitment to the 
supernatural. For example, the Discovery Institute definition I cited in Section 1 
simply says that “The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the 
universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause”1, without 
specifying whether that intelligent cause is natural or supernatural. If opponents of 
ID insist that that definition is a misrepresentation of ID, since ID is inherently 
theistic, then the natural response is to put a new doctrine on the table, ID*: “The 
theory of intelligent design* holds that certain features of the universe and of 
living things are best explained by an intelligent cause.”  
 It should be clear that ID* is not inherently theistic. The intelligent cause 
could be God, but it need not be. It may be that living things on Earth were 
created by a highly intelligent alien civilization, as Raelians believe.2 It may be 
that the whole universe we experience is really just a computer simulation being 
run by highly intelligent non-supernatural beings, as Nick Bostrom (2003) argues 
is plausible. It takes just a bit of creativity to come up with other possibilities as 
well. 
 Proponents of ID (construed supernaturalistically) are also proponents of 
ID*. It follows that the vast majority of proponents of ID* are theistic – they 
maintain that the intelligent cause is a supernatural God. But it in no way follows 
that ID* itself is committed to supernaturalism. ID* is a disjunctive theory – one 
possibility is that the intelligent cause is supernatural, but the other possibility is 
that the intelligent cause is natural. Just because most proponents of ID* endorse 
one of the disjuncts, it in no way follows that the theory itself is not disjunctive.  
 I have introduced this ‘ID*’ terminology to placate those who say that ID 
is inherently theistic. But my definition of ‘ID*’ is the same as the definition of 
‘ID’ that for example the Discovery Institute endorses. I recommend that, to avoid 
terminological messiness, we simply take proponents of ID at their word that the 
doctrine they are endorsing is the doctrine that I’ve called ‘ID*’. It follows that ID 
is not inherently theistic.  
 
4. Science and the Pursuit of Truth.  If science really is permanently committed 
to methodological naturalism, it follows that the aim of science is not generating 
true theories. Instead, the aim of science would be something like: generating the 
                                                 
1 For simplicity I will focus on the positive part of their doctrine, ignoring the “not 
an undirected process such as natural selection” part. 
 
2 For more information on the Raelians, see for example 
http://religiousmovements.lib.virginia.edu/nrms/rael.html. 
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best theories that can be formulated subject to the restriction that the theories are 
naturalistic. More and more evidence could come in suggesting that a supernatural 
being exists, but scientific theories wouldn’t be allowed to acknowledge that 
possibility. Imagine what might happen in my pulsar message scenario – long 
after overwhelming evidence has convinced everyone that supernatural causation 
is occurring, scientists would still be searching for naturalistic causes. The 
scientists themselves may agree that the causes are supernatural, but, because they 
are subject to the constraint of methodological naturalism, they are not allowed to 
postulate such causes while doing science. Science would rightfully be 
marginalized – what is the point of spending all these resources investigating 
naturalistic causes, long after it is evident that the causes are supernatural? I’m not 
saying that society would want to completely stop investigating the possibility of 
natural causes, but by failing to countenance the possibility of supernatural 
hypotheses in the pulsar scenario, scientists would be missing out on a potential 
revolution in our understanding of the world.  
 Jones seems aware of the fact that his demarcation criteria entail that the 
aim of science is not truth. He writes that “while ID arguments may be true, a 
proposition on which the Court takes no position, ID is not science” (p. 64). But if 
science is not a pursuit of truth, science has the potential to be marginalized, as an 
irrelevant social practice. If lots of evidence comes in against naturalism, 
investigation of the world that assumes naturalism has the potential to become 
otiose. Given the commitment to methodological naturalism, the success of 
science hinges on the contingent fact that the evidence strongly suggests that 
naturalism is true.   
 I maintain that science is better off without being shackled by 
methodological naturalism. Our successful scientific theories are naturalistic 
simply because this is the way the evidence points; this leaves open the possibility 
that, on the basis of new evidence, there could be supernatural scientific theories. 
I conclude that ID should not be dismissed on the grounds that it is unscientific; 
ID should be dismissed on the grounds that the empirical evidence for its claims 
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